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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN

THE

MATTER

OF

THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF FLORENCE
S. VALENTINE, ALLEGED

Case No. 8415

INCOMPETENT.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts and issues in this appeal can best be appreciated by the court after a statement as to the identity
and interest of the respective parties and the issues before the court.
A.

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

1. Florence S. Valentine

Florence S. Valentine is the widow of J. Howard
Valentine, founder and promoter of Western States Refining Company, who died in November, 1952. She and
her children inherited from him in excess of 380,000
shares of the stock in that company. In 1953, suit was
commenced against her individually and as executrix of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the estate of J. Howard Valentine, deceased, and a~
guardian of her then minor children, and Associated
Dealers, a Valentine-controlled corporation, to cancel
certain of the shares of stock in Western States Refining
Company which they had received by gift or inheritance
from J. Howard Valentine, on the basis that the shares
had been illegally issued to ~tfr. Valentine, and for a
money judgment for sums alleged to have been wrongfully received by ~Ir. and Mrs. Valentine from the corporation and for the unpaid portion of water in other
shares of Western States stock issued to them. This
action is No. 98754, in the Third Judicial District Court.
In February, 1954, Mrs. Valentine employed Irwin
Arnovitz to represent her in all her capacities in that
litigation.
2.

Irwin Arnovitz

Irwin Arnovitz is a member of the Bar of this court
and is the Petitioner who is seeking in these proceedings
to have his former client declared incompetent and to
have a guardian appointed for her personal estate. He
was employed by Mrs. Valentine in February, 1954, to
represent her in the suit then pending in the Third
Judicial District Court as K o. 98754. Thi~ case was
tried over an extended period in April, 1954, and at
the conclusion of the trial, Judge Jeppson entered tentative findings in favor of the corporation and against Mr.
Arnovitz' clients. After considerable delay, due primarily
to Mr. Arnovitz' absence in Europe, a final judgment
was entered against ~Irs. Y alentine in all her capacities
in January, 1955, for cancellation of 73,311 shares of
2
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Western States Refining Company stock received by her
and her children from the late J. H. Valentine, and a
money judgment of approximately $103,000 for which a
lien was impressed against an additional 136,000 shares
of Western States Refining Company stock on the finding that said shares had not been fully paid for by Mr.
Valentine. Apparently dissatisfied with Mr. Arnovitz'
handling of her case, Mrs. Valentine discharged him in
early March, 1955. When he appeared without authority
in the Eliason case, (which will be mentioned below) she
discharged him a second time on May 3, 1955. Shortly
after that incident, Mr. Arnovitz filed the petition which
is before this court to have Mrs. Valentine declared incompetent.
3. Sid H. Eliason
Sid H. Eliason is a Salt Lake businessman and is
represented in these proceedings by the author of this
brief. In November 1953, a Mr. D. H. Linney purchased
an option from Mrs. Valentine to acquire 300,000 shares
of vV estern States Refining Company stock from her
and a coporation known as "Associated Dealers", which
she controlled, for One Dollar per share. In 1954 Mr.
Eliason becmne financially interested in the Refining
Company and among other things, purchased an assignment of the above referred to option from Mr. Linney.
Mrs. Valentine refused to perform the option and Eliason
brought suit against her and Associated Dealers for
specific performance. This is case No. 101780 in the
Third Judicial District Court.
Mrs. Valentine was first represented in 1hat action
3
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by Samuel W. Stewart and Stewart, Cannon and Hanson. Shortly before the matter was set for trial, on
March 2, 1955, she employed Herbert B. Maw to represent her in that action and in Case No. 98754. Mr. Maw
obtained a continuance of the trial of the Eliason suit
until May 2, 1955 in order to familiarize himself with the
facts of the case and filed an amended answer setting up
a number of additional defenses. Pending the trial, considerable negotiations were had between counsel for Mr.
Eliason and Mr. Maw and James L. White, who held a
power of attorney from Mrs. Valentine to discuss a
settlement, but not to complete one, toward settlement
of both cases. Counsel were unable to reach agreement
and Case No. 101780 was tried before Judge Ray Van
Cott, Jr., on May 2, and 3, 1955. Judgment for specific
performance of the option was granted to Mr. Eliason.
A few days later, Arnovitz filed the Petition in this case.
No notice of filing of the petition or of the date of hearing thereon was served upon Mr. Eliason or his counsel,
although the proceeding was a patent attempt to defeat
the Eliason judgment. Mr. Arnovitz also intervened in
case No. 101780 to file a motion for a new trial. This
motion was denied by Judge Van Cott without passing
on the question of the right or power of :M:r. Arnovitz
to intervene. No appeal has been taken in that action.
As soon as counsel for Eliason discovered the exiStence of the Arnovitz petition, leave to intervene herein
was asked and granted the day before the petition was
to be heard.
It will be readily seen that Eliason did not intervene
4
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in this proceeding on behalf of 1frs. Valentine. He intervened to protect against any collateral attack by this proceeding his interest in the 300,000 shares of stock in Western States Refining Company obtained by reason of his
judgment for specific performance of the option. This
position of adverse interest has been frankly stated from
the beginning by intervenor without any camouflage or
protestations of innocence.
B. The Issue
The true issue before this court may best be stated
by reference to the orders appealed from.
The order of August 2, 1955 signed by Judge Baker
reads in part as follows:
"The alleged incompetent Florence S. Valentine and the Intervenor have moved the court to
dismiss the proceedings on the ground that the
Petition and the facts stated in open court in support thereof by petitioner did not constitute
grounds upon which a guardian should be appointed and good cause appearing therefor,

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
and DECREED that the petition for appointment
of a guardian of the property of Florence S. Valentine, be and it hereby is dismissed." (R. 40)
1Ir. Arnovitz then filed a so-called Amendment to
the Petition and this carne on for hearing before the
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, who had also tried No.
98754. Judge Jeppson's order reads in part as follows:
"It appearing to the court that the petition
of said Irwin Arnovitz had heretofore been dismissed under date of August 2, 1955, upon motion
of the alleged incompetent and the intervenor that

5
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the facts stated in the petition and the statement
of Petitioner in open court as to what he proposed
to prove did not constitute grounds upon which a
guardian should be appointed, and it appearing to
the court that the proposed amendment to the petition did not submit any additional facts which
would constitute grounds upon which a guardian
should be appointed,
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
and DECREED, that the amended petition for
the appointment of a guardian of Florence S.
Valentine, be, and it hereby is dismissed." (R. 43)
Thus, it is readily apparent that the rulings below
were not alone based upon the allegations of the petition,
but were based on the opening statement of J.Ir. Arnovitz at the hearing before Judge Baker as to what he
proposed to prove. Therefore, the issue before this court
is whether, assuming all the facts stated in the petition,
and in Mr. Arnovitz' opening state1nent to be true, the
trial court correctly non-suited l\Ir. Arnovitz. This, of
course, is not what l\Ir. Arnovitz would like to have this
court believe the issue is, as shown by his brief to this
court and his failure in his designation of record (R.
, 5~) to even mention the transcript of the hearing before
.~ udge Baker. Again, if it had not been for intervenor
naking an additional designation of the record, all the
acts would not have c01ne before this court.
Judge Baker in granting the n1otion to dismiss, acted
1pon the facts in the allegations in the petition and those
-facts stated in the opening statement of ~Ir. Arnovitz as
!to what he proposed to prove. The transcript of the
6
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hearing before Judge Baker bears this out. At page 10
of the record, the trial court said:
"The Court. You may proceed.
"Mr. Arnovitz: The matter requires some
little statement. I would like to make this outline
to the court. * * *"
Mr. Arnovitz then proceeded for some fourteen pages of
transcript to outline the facts he would prove in his proposed case. At page 26 of the transcript the court inquired:
"The Court: Well, what do you intend to
show regarding her incompetence~
"Mr. Arnovitz: We are going to show she is
unable to alone carry out her business affairs
which, under our statute, comes under the definition of incompetence."
And then, on page 27, line 19, Mr. Arnovitz summed it
up by saying:
"We intend to substantiate the facts as stated."
Counsel for Eliason inquired at page 28 of the record:
"Mr. Billings: What other evidence do y have other than stated this morning in your stat
mentf'
Mr. Arnovitz replied (R. 29):
"Arnovitz: It would be this court woul':} hav
the right to observe witnesses."
In other words, all Arnovitz could ever gain by a hear.
ing would be for the court to determine whether or not it

7
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would believe the witnesses, assuming they would testify
as he claimed.
It is submitted nothing further could be gained from
such an inquisition of Mrs. Valentine. The trial court,
after hearing Mr. Arnovitz offer and detail his proof,
stated (R. 29, lines 25-59) :
"The court : Well, I doubt the sufficiency of
these grounds, as stated, I doubt the sufficiency of
any of these grounds to prove this woman is incompetent. Is that the sole issue to be before this
court~"

Mr. Arnovitz again asked the court to hear the evidence
as to whether he would prove what he said he was going
to prove, but offered to prove no other facts than as
theretofore stated in his opening statement.
Counsel for Eliason had moved to dismiss at the
conclusion of Mr. Arnovitz' opening statement on the
ground that the facts as alleged in the petition and as
stated in the opening statement did not constitute grounds
in law for the appointment of a guardian of Mrs. Valentine as an alleged incompetent (R. 26, line 7 and R-30,
line 15) and that 1\fr. Arnovitz was not a proper party
to file the petition. 1\Irs. Valentine then joined in this
motion ( R. 35, lines 26-29). The court then took the matter under advisement and later granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds stated. (R. 40)
It is in this posture then, that the orders dismissing
the petition come before this court for review.
There is only one issue : Do the facts as stated in the
petition and in 1\fr. Arnovitz' opening statement, constitute grounds showing it to be necessary that a guardian
8
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should be appointed for the property of Mrs. Valentine
on the basis that she is incompetent as defined in Section
75-13-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ~ This issue can be
resolved on the record before this court, without camouflage as to the true nature of the decision of the court
below.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

II.
FINED
1953.
III.
PARTY

THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED WAS CORRECT.
MRS. VALENTINE IS NOT INCOMPETENT AS DEIN SEoCTION 75-13-20, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
PETITIONER ARNOVITZ IS NOT A PROPER
TO FILE THE SUBJECT PETITION.

ARGUl\1ENT
I.

THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED WAS CORRECT.

The procedure adopted by the trial court in dismissing the petition, after the opening statement of Mr.
Arnovitz as to what he would seek to establish by the incompetency of Mrs. Valentine and the necessity for a
guardian, has long been recognized. See Bancroft "Code
Practice and Remedies," § 524, and annotations at 83
ALR 219 and 129 ALR 557. As stated by the Circuit
Court of Appeals (C.A. 5, 1947) in Cutliff v. Comr. of
Internal Revenue, 163 F. 2d 891:
"The opening statements of counsel are not
idle talk, but may afford the basis of deciding the
case."
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
that there is no question of the power of the trial court
to direct a verdict for defendant or dismiss the proceedings upon the opening statement of plaintiff's counsel
9
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where that statement establishes that the plaintiff has no
rights in the matter. As the court in Best v. Dep. of Com.,
291 U.S. 411,78 L. Ed. 882,885 said:
"The power of the court to act upon the facts
conceded by counsel is as plain as the power to
act upon evidence produced."
The comment of Mr. Justice Fie~d in one of the leading
cases before the Supreme Court on such procedure,
Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U.S.
261, 26 L. Ed. 539, 541, is particularly appropriate here:
"Here there were no unguarded expressions
used nor any ambiguous statements made. The
opening counsel was fully apprised of all the facts
out of which his client's claim originated and seldom was a case opened with greater fullness of
detail."
Under our rules of civil procedure, it would appear
to be proper under Rule 12 (c) and Rule 56. Firfer v.U.S.,
208 F. 2d 524 (C.A. D.C.1953). Under such circumstances,
no findings of fact are required. See Rule 52 (a). The
facts as stated by the petition and by ~Ir. Arnovitz in his
opening statement are treated as proof and as though the
evidence described had actually been introduced. Charpentier v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (N.H. 1940) 13 A. 2d
141 ; Anno : 83 ALR 226, 129 ALR 560.
The cases cited by appellant in his brief stand for
no different rule. In Re Lee's Guardianship, 267 P. 2d 847
(Calif. 1954), the California court rule on the basis of
"highly conflicting affidavits." Of course, under Rule
56, a summary judgment would be in1proper when a conflict in material evidence exists. In the case of /11 Re
10
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Tilton's Estate and Guardianship, 114 P. 595, there had
been a hearing and the appeal was from a failure to dismiss on the grounds that the petition was uncertain,
stated merely conclusions, and on the ground of a claimed
lack of jurisdiction. The California court merely held
that there were sufficient facts alleged to give it jurisdiction and to make an inquiry necessary as to whether
the guardian was competent. No other staternent was
madeby the petitioner as to what he would prove as was
in the case at bar. In the case of In Re Denny's Guardianship, 218 P. 2d 792, the California trial court rejected
the petition on the ground that a Nevada divorce was invalid and hence the court was without jurisdiction. On
appeal it was held that the defendant could not assert
the invalidity of the Nevada divorce as she was the one
who had obtained the divorce and that therefore the court
should have heard the evidence to determine whether it
was necessary and proper to have a guardian appointed
for the minor children of the parties. These cases pose
a far different situation from the case at bar where the
court ruled only after the petitioner had stated in detail
all the evidence he was going to present as to the competency of Mrs. Valentine.
In the first Arnovitz case, I-I eath et al. v. Arnovitz,
et al., 102 U. 1, 126 P. 2d 1058 (1942), the appellant had
filed a special and general demurrer. This court ruled
that the general statements in the petition in the language
of the statute were sufficient to escape a general or special demurrer. But here, the petition has gone further
than merely alleging in general terms the language of 7511
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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13-20. Petitioner has detailed for some eight pages in his
petition facts he claims establish Mrs. Valentine's incompetency and stated for some fourteen plus pages of transscript what he proposed to prove to the court in this regard. All the lower court could have found by hearing the
evidence would be questions as to the veracity of the
witnesses or whether their story was as good as Mr.
Arnovitz stated it would be.
II. MRS. VALENTINE IS NOT INCOMPETENT AS DEFINED IN SE.CTION 75-13-20, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953.

For the purposes of this argument, we will accept
in general the allegations of fact made in the petition
and in J\1:r. Arnovitz' opening statement as being established, but to meet any innuendos that may arise from
such acceptance in general we desire to make it clear
that such allegations are only one party's myopic views of
the actual facts.
Section 75-13-19 provides for appointment of a
guardian of the estate of an incompetent when it appears
necessary upon a petition of a relative or friend. This
appeal raises the question of whether on the facts established by Mr. Arnovitz in his petition, and in his statement to the court it is demonstrated that Mrs. Valentine
is incmnpetent as defined in the Utah statute, and whether
Petitioner Arnovitz may be classed as a "relative" or
"friend."
Section 75-13-20 defines incompetency as follows:
"The words 'incompetent', 'mentally incompetent' and 'incapable', as used in this title, shall
be construed to mean any person who, though not
12
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insane, is, by reason of old age, disease, weakness
of mind, or from any other cause, unable, unassisted, to properly manage and take care of himself or his property, and by reason thereof would
be likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful
or designing persons."
·
This court had before it the language of this section in

Heath, et al. v. Arnovitz, et al., supra, which for comparison with the case at bar, might· be designated the first
Arnovitz case.
In that case, Mr. Arnovitz, appearing as attorney
in fact for the daughters of the alleged incompetent, had
filed a petition to have one Joseph A. Heath declared
incompetent and a guardian appointed for his property
on the same ground as in the case at bar, i.e., that he was
likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons. Referring to the statutory definition (Section 75-13-20) this court said in that case:
"The section implies physical or mental defects which interfere with the rational functioning
of the mind. If the mind functions rationally but
the individual acts in a way commonly designated
as eccentric-that is, his acts deviate from the
usual principally because he is less susceptible to
public opinion than are many of us-he is not incompetent. One may love gardening--it was so
testified of Mr. Heath-and not be interested in
anything else even to the extent of losing his property at the hands of unscrupulous friends or relatives. He may be foolish in the eyes of many of
us, but he is not incompetent. Competency is not
measured by one's ability to accumulate and hold
the material things of life. Were it so, there would
be many of our ministerial brethren-not to men13
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tion some of our learned judicial associates-behind mental bars."
In the first Arnovitz case, strong reliance was placed
on the claim that Mr. Heath was not as astute a businessman as Mr. Arnovitz would have desired, and had suffered losses by not understanding all the important parts of
business transactions. Said the court of this contention:
"Material loss in and of itself is a very dangerous bit of evidence from which to reason backward to a conclusion of incompetency. Such loss
may be attributable to any number of causes such
as indifference, laziness, lack of education, poor
business judgment, dislike of a particular class of
work or business-there are many possibilities.
Thus, in passing upon the question of incompetency we must determine if the evidence of loss is
accompanied by evidence of physical or mental
defect which interferes with the rational functioning of the mind. Undue influence arising from
deep friendship for, or extreme confidence in
others, alone, is not evidence of incompetency of
the victim. It may be the instrumentality used
upon an incompetent victim but there must be
other evidence of that incompetence. Strong mentalities are ofttimes the victims of undue influence."
With these interpretations of the Ftah statute in
mind, the appellant's version of the facts in the case at
bar, which 1night well be designated the second Arnovitz
case, should be considered.
(a) 1\fr. Arnovitz c01nplains that he was discharged after losing the \\-.-estern States Refining
Company case and his client will not appeal.
What an unfortunate situation our courts would be in,

14
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and to what level would public opinion of the bar sink if
every time an attorney lost a case and was discharged by
his client, he could have the client hauled in for inquisition as to his competency!
(b) Mr. Arnovitz complains that Mrs. Valentine would not appeal the Western States case and
otherwise would not follow his advice. He states
that she has also discharged other attorneys and
now appears on her own behalf.
To paraphrase the language of this court 1n the first
Arnovitz case, "One r.aay dislike lawyers-and insist
on representing himself, even to the extent of losing his
property at the hands of unscrupulous friends or lawyers.
He may be foolish in the eyes of others, particularly
lawyers, but he is not incompetent."
(c) Mr. Arnovitz complains Mrs. Valentine
was unwilling to appeal the Western States Refining case or to settle both the Western States
and Eliason cases.
The answer to that complaint may be found in this court's
quotation frmn O'Reilly v. McLean, (1934) 84 Utah 551,
at p. 557, 37 P. 2d 770, at 772, as follows:
"Were the mental faculties so deficient or
i1npaired that there was not sufficient power to
comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature
and its probable consequences, and to act ·with
discretion in relation thereto, or with relation to
the ordinary affairs of life f'
and its comments thereon in the 1st Arnovitz case :
"In other words, the evidence must show a
lack of power to function-not an unwillingness
15
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to or lack of interest in functioning, be the latter
two ever so reprehensible as personal characteristics." 126 P. 2d 1058, 1061.
(d) Mr. Arnovitz points out that the judgment which Mrs. Valentine declines to appeal affects the interests of her children as well as her
own.
It may be that she is guilty of mismanagement or negligence as their guardian, or as executrix of the estate of
her late husband, on which grounds she could be removed
under sections 75-13-9 or 75-6-1, as either guardian or
executrix. But that is a far different thing than taking
from her the control of her own property. The comments
of this court in the first Arnovitz case quoted above make
that point abundantly clear.
As recognized by the California court in applying
a similar statutory definition of incompetency:
"Generally speaking, an adult person has a
right to control his own person and affairs, and
that right should not be taken from him, except
upon a showing of the statutory grounds warranting a restriction of his liberty of action for his
own protection."

In re Watson, 168 P. 341, (Cal. 1917), Estate of
Schulmeyer, 153 P. 233.
(e) Mr. Arnovitz contends that Mrs. Valentine, quite aside from the stock she received from
her husband and contracted to sell to lvfr. Eliason,
purchased after Mr. Valentine's death 70,000
shares of Western States Refining Company stock
at $2.00 per share and later sold some of it for
only .50 per share.
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If that is a basis for incompetency, there are numerous
professional investors and stock brokers who are in danger of having a guardian appointed for their property,
particularly, if they have ever had Mr. Arnovitz as their
legal counsel.
(f) Mr. Arnovitz complains about 1\Irs. Valentine's conduct of the litigation with Mr. Eliason.
First of all, she did not decide to employ him.
Then, he claims, she would not cooperate fully
with Mr. 1\Iaw to enable him to prepare her case.
From the records of that case, it is apparent that she
furnished Mr. Maw sufficient information to enable him
to prepare and file an amended answer. Her deposition
was taken by plaintiff in that case and Mr. Maw was present on that occasion. It is difficult to characterize that
conduct as lack of cooperation. Mr. Arnovitz also points
out that she failed to appear for cross examination after
having spent half a day on the stand giving her direct
testimony. He quite overlooks the possibility that her
experience with courts and courtrooms in the Western
States Refining Company case may have made the prospects of a searching cross examination too rniserable
to warrant further court appearance. To make the record
clear, in the Eliason case, no one was trying to take away
·her property for nothing. That action was to enforce a
contract for the purchase and sale of 300,000 shares of
stock at $1 per share, which the evidence in that case
showed was above the current market price, both at the
time the option _was given and at the time it was exercised.
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Then, of course, 1\fr. Arnovitz is troubled by the fact
that Mrs. Valentine sent telegrams not only formally
discharging Mr. Maw but even 1\fr. Arnovitz himself for
the second time, because of his unasked for appearance
at the trial as an "observor." One may characterize Mrs.
Valentine's conduct with respect to her employment of
counsel as eccentric, but as this court has stated, "that
is not incompetency." Heath v. Arnovitz, supra.
(g) Mr. Arnovitz mentions disharmony in
the management of Western States Refining Company due to the activities of Mrs. Valentine.
At her husband's death she succeeded him as chairman
of the Board of Directors of that company. It is apparent from the record in this case alone that Mrs. Valentine is a very strong willed woman, yet with a woman's
erratic and emotional tendencies, particularly, in business affairs. The stockholders' suit which was eventually
filed in 1953 as Case K o. 98754, was imminent at the time
this disharmony existed. No wonder there was antagonism and disharmony among the board! She would have
had to have the highest degree of administrative and
executive skill to handle that situation. No one contends
that Mrs. Valentine is a genius or even a good businesswmnan, but that is no ground for the appoinbnent of a
guardian to look after her affairs. In re WaiteS'' Guardianship, 97 P. 2d 238 (Calif. 1939): In Re Baldridge, 266
P. 2d 103, (Calif. 1954) Iu Re Delany, 226 S.\Y. 2d 366
(Mo. 1950).
Every businessn1an would be at the mercy of a "relative" or "friend" if this court would accept such a stand18
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ard for incompetency. I-Iistory is full of examples of inventors who died impoverished because they were not
good businessmen. The old adage about "shirt sleeves
to shirt sleeves in three generations" would not have developed if all sons and grandsons were successful in holding on the property their forebears had accumulated.
Our society has not established the paternalistic practice
of having a court step in and appoint a guardian merely
because the heirs were unsuccessful businessmen or
profligate dissipators of their patrimony.
(h) In his amendment to the petition (R.
41) :Mr. Arnovitz complains that Mrs. Valentine
relies on her own peculiar views of the law and
has not delivered her stock to the clerk of the court
or taken steps to collect the money deposited there
by l\!Ir. Eliason to carry out the judgment he had
obtained for specific performance.
Peculiar or not, the record in Case No. 98754, which is
before this court on ~1r. Arnovitz' pro se appeal, shows
Western States Refining Company was unable to enforce
its judgment which nfr. Arnovitz would like to appeal
because :Mrs. Valentine refused to deliver over the stock
certificates. Finally, the Refinery Company obtained a
court order cancelling the shares held by ~frs. Valentine
and ordering the secretary of the company to issue new
certificates and deliver them to the clerk of the court
to enforce the judgment. The judgment in the Western
States Refinery case was then carried out against these
new certificates and Mr. Eliason enforced a portion of his
judgment for specific performance by redeeming 13n,OOO
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shares from the lien imposed by the Western States'
judgment. While technically the courts below have partially enforced the judgments against 11rs. Valentine,
she still has possession of all the stock. As a result, there
are duplicate shares outstanding, at least to the extent of
136,000 shares, and, as a consequence, the shares acquired by Mr. Eliason are of questionable marketability
despite his judgment. In effect, Mrs. Valentine has frustrated the processes of the law by her attitude which
Mr. Arnovitz condemns as a sign of incompetency. While
not commendable, her actions have secured the ends she
has desired-the thwarting of the orderly processes of
law in carrying out the judgments obtained against her.
One would hesitate to declare that Andrew Jackson was
incompetent, yet he was reported to have said: "John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it."
III. PETITIONER ARNOVITZ IS NOT A PROPER
PARTY TO FILE THE SUBJECT PETITION.

Another question arises in this case which is also
discussed in the first Arnovitz case. The statute (75-1319, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) authorizes the filing
of a petition for appointn1ent of a guardian for incompetency by a relative or a friend. :K eedless to say, !Ir.
Arnovitz is not a relative, nor can he really be classified
as a friend (In Re Oswald, (~.J. 1942) 28 A. 2d 399),
despite the shining armor he has assumed throughout his
brief.
In the first Arnovitz case, ~Ir. Arnovitz satisfied
this court that he ·was the attorney in fact for the children
and his act as such in filing the petition was, in legal ef20
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feet, their own and that therefore, the requirement of
the statute so far as a relative was concerned, was satisfied. In the case at bar, the record indicates that Mrs.
Valentine has plenty of relatives (R. 48a), two sisters and
a brother, who could act if they felt it necessary. No
such relative has seen fit to join in the petition of Mr.
Arnovitz. In fact, both sisters, whose statements are not
reported in the transcript, (R. 36) appeared in opposition to the appointment. The pleadings in the petition
would indicate that l\1r. Arnovitz is relying on his position as counsel for the minor children in the Western
States Refining Company case to justify the filing of the
petition here. It is true he wa.s the attorney for Florence
S. Valentine, guardian of the estate of the then minor
children. The record indicates (R. 44-45) that two of the
·children are now of age, but he was not their attorney in
fact, as was the situation in the first Arnovitz case. It is
indeed a broad stretch of jurisdiction which would enable
him, as attorney for them in the Western States Refining
Company case, to persuade a court to allow him to draw
an order directing him to file a petition for the appointment of a guardian for the estate of their mother. If
there is any question about her competency to act as their
guardian or as executrix, the proper procedure would
have been to have taken the steps for her removal in
those capacities. That having been done, the guardian
of the minor children might be a proper person to file
a petition with respect to the competency of the mother,
but not the discharged and disgruntled attorney.
It is difficult to see then, how the order of the judge
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in the matter of the guardianship of the minor children
(R. 48d, 48e) qualified Mr. Arnovitz as a relative under
the statute to file the petition which is before this court.
This leaves only the category "friend." It is true
that the courts have determined that no particular degree
of intimacy is required to consider the person the
"friend" of the alleged incompetent. In Re Wagoner,
151 Mich. 74, 114 N.W. 868, the court said:
"Courts have usually regarded a friend as
one who entertains regard for another, who takes
active interest in his welfare, or is one favorably
disposed toward a person."

A friend has also been defined as one who :
"* * * is seemingly upon harmonious terms
with another."
Grand v. Thompson, 174 Tenn. 278, 125 S.W. 2d 133.
It would take a great deal of soul searching to come
to the conclusion that the Petitioner-appellant in this
case, meets those definitions.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the courts below correctly concluded that the facts as stated in Mr. Arnovitz' petition
and in his opening statement clearly show:
(a) That Mrs. Valentine is not incompetent to manage her property.
(b) That Mr. Arnovitz is not a proper party to file
the subject petition.
For these reasons judgment of the courts below dismissing these proceedings should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PETER W. BILLINGS of
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, l\fOFFAT
& MABEY
Attorneys for Respondent
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